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INTRODUCTION
The legal framework that was built almost two decades ago
now struggles to keep pace with the rapid expansion of
technology, including quantum computing and artificial
intelligence, and an ever-evolving cyber threat landscape. In
2002, California passed the first data breach notification law,
with all fifty states following suit to require notice of
unauthorized access to and acquisition of an individual’s
personal information.1 These data breach notification laws,
originally designed to capture one-off unauthorized views of
data in a computerized database, were not built to address
PowerShell scripts by cyber terrorists run across thousands of
servers, leaving automated accessed data in their wake.
Similarly, the safe harbors for encryption built into these
statutes were not designed with quantum computing and its
possibility of quantum decryption in mind. These evolving
technologies and threats require that state data breach
notification laws be reformulated for a modern era. This
Comment examines the interplay between these challenges and
discusses a path forward.
I.

EMERGING THREATS HAVE UPENDED DATA BREACH
NOTIFICATION LAWS

A myriad of exploited threat vectors have emerged in the
two decades since California passed the first data breach
notification law. Most recently, the proliferation of ransomware,
and, in particular, double extortion ransomware, has emerged
as a scourge to society. Ransomware “is an ever-evolving form of
malware designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any
files and systems that rely on them unusable,” unless a ransom
is paid in exchange for a decryption key.2 In the case of double
extortion ransomware, threat actors go beyond encrypting data
in place by also exporting victim data for sale or threatening

1. Phillip Harmon, Data Breach Notification Laws and the Quantum
Decryption Problem, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 471, 479 (2022).
2. Ransomware 101, STOP RANSOMWARE, https://perma.cc/V5TA-9HMS.
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publication as blackmail.3 In 2019, a group of cyber-criminal
pioneers, known as the “Maze” group, instigated the first
published double extortion case involving Allied Universal, a
security staffing company based in the United States.4 News
articles in 2019 called this a “game-changing blackmail model.”5
In the case of Allied Universal, Maze reportedly stole 7 GB
worth of data prior to executing their encryption tactics to
encrypt the Allied Universal network.6 Maze then approached
their victim demanding 300 bitcoins, valued at approximately
$2.6 million at the time.7 When the victim refused to pay, Maze
published 700 MB of data on a Russian hacking forum on the
dark web.8 This reflected approximately “10% of the [data]
stolen” and, after posting, Maze contacted the information
security magazine, Bleeping Computer, to share information
about the heist.9 Maze, in writing to Bleeping Computer, claimed
it was “writing to you because we have breached Allied
Universal security firm (aus.com), downloaded data and
executed Maze ransomware in their network.”10
Cyber-criminal gangs soon began to follow Maze’s method
of
double
extortion.
Groups
began
offering
“ransomware-as-a-service” or RaaS, with threat groups offering
malware and infrastructure in exchange for a fee or profit
3. See Janus Agcaoili et al., Ransomware Double Extortion and Beyond:
REvil, Clop, and Conti, TREND MICRO (June 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/Q5VG77D9; Ransomware 101, supra note 2; see also Brian Stack, Here’s How Much
Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web, EXPERIAN (Dec. 6,
2017), https://perma.cc/9SFW-Q4AN (describing the ten most common pieces
of information sold on the dark web with prices that range from $1 to $2,000).
4. Ransomware Evolved: Double Extortion, CHECK POINT RSCH. (Apr. 16,
2020), https://perma.cc/4VWZ-G3RM.
5. Muhammad Hamza Shahid, Ransomware Adopts a Game-Changing
Blackmail Model for Information Theft, INFO SEC. (July 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5M9V-7R6E.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Lawrence Abrams, Allied Universal Breached by Maze Ransomware,
Stolen Data Leaked, BLEEPING COMPUT. (Nov. 21, 2019, 10:48 PM),
https://perma.cc/38VJ-ELBG (explaining that Bleeping Computer received an
email signed “Maze Crew” reporting the theft and stating that Maze group
“always exfiltrate[s], or steal[s], a victim’s files” before it encrypts any
computer).
10. Id.
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sharing.11 Cyber-criminal cartels—cyber criminals operating
Soprano’s-style gang families—began to emerge, both locking
data and stealing it.12
The threat actors employ sophisticated tactics to execute
their malicious activity, often utilizing software scripts to
execute the removal of data and utilizing anti-forensic
techniques to hide their tracks.13 For example, the PYSA
ransomware operation uses a PowerShell script set to execute
across a victim’s network, gathering up any file that hits on
search terms such as “SSN,” “bank*statement,” or “W-2.”14 A
PowerShell “is a cross-platform task automation solution made
up of a command-line shell, a scripting language, and a
configuration management framework.”15 In other words, it is
an automated line of coding designed by non-malicious or
malicious software coders to execute a function on a device. In
the case of PYSA, or a similar threat actor group, after entering
a victim organization’s environment undetected, they run a
PowerShell script to gather up and remove documents from the
victim network for later use on a shame website.16 The
PowerShell script runs automatically, canvassing files using
search terms and ultimately exporting a subset of data to the
threat actor.17
Using a script results in potential “access” to thousands of
files across the entirety of an organization’s servers. In many
instances, it may be impossible to discern whether these files
were ever viewed by a real person or just technically modified
using a software script. Similarly, there are often limits on an
organization’s knowledge of whether the data accessed by the
11. Stu Sjouwerman, Ransomware Gangs: Who Are They and How to Stop
Them, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2021, 9:15 AM), https://perma.cc/BS7U-JTXA (noting
the “U.S. government has elevated ransomware threats to a level of priority
similar to that of terrorism”).
12. See id. (“The FBI is monitoring more than 100 active ransomware
gangs . . . .”).
13. Lawrence Abrams, Ransomware Gang’s Script Shows Exactly the
Files They’re After, BLEEPING COMPUT. (Aug. 24, 2021, 2:16 PM) [hereinafter
Abrams, Ransomware Gang] , https://perma.cc/9R85-CPDT.
14. Id.
15. What
Is
Powershell?,
MICROSOFT
(Oct.
5,
2021),
https://perma.cc/ES7S-ZT5B.
16. See Abrams, Ransomware Gang, supra note 13.
17. Id.
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script left the network. If the modified or accessed files contain
personal identifying information, the question becomes whether
this automated script access is enough to trigger a data breach
notification to an individual.
These new threat tacticsremoving data by automated
means using software scriptingmust be reconciled with data
breach notification laws that were written in a much simpler
time of cybercrime. As discussed in Part III, these laws were not
drafted with these largescale automated searches in mind.
STATE DATA BREACH STATUTES FAIL TO ADDRESS
AUTOMATED WIDESPREAD ACCESS AND UNCLEAR ACQUISITION
II.

“Breach notification laws have been a major driver of data
protection efforts in U.S. organizations for more than a
decade.”18 These laws serve a laudable purpose: they require
custodians of personal information to inform individuals when
their personal information has been compromised so that they
can take steps to protect themselves from identity theft.19 But
achieving this end can be challenging because the conditions
that trigger the duty to notify are not well defined.
With respect to these conditions, data breach notification
laws can be divided into two categories. Most data breach laws
require notification when “unauthorized acquisition” of personal
information occurs.20 Other statutes require notification when
“unauthorized acquisition and access” occurs.21 However,
because acquisition cannot occur without access, these statutes
can be grouped together. In a minority of states, the duty to
notify is triggered by events that include “unauthorized access”

18. David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory) Effects, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE-NOVO 151, 151 (2015).
19. See Harmon, supra note 1, at 479 (“Data breach notification laws have
the dual purpose of protecting private citizens and holding data owners
accountable”).
20. See LIISA M. THOMAS, THOMAS ON DATA BREACH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO HANDLING DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS WORLDWIDE § 2:25 (2020) (listing
state statutes that define a security breach as an unauthorized acquisition of
personal information).
21. Id.; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2021) (“‘Breach of the
security of the system’ means the unauthorized access and acquisition of
unencrypted and unredacted computerized data . . . .”).
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to personal information.22 Thus, state data breach statutes fall
into two categories: the majority approach, which requires both
unauthorized access and acquisition to trigger notification, and
the minority approach, which requires only unauthorized
access.
While the minority approach may seem to offer greater
protection than the majority approach, it presents compliance
problems because threat actors are adept at disguising their
access to security systems. Such access can often go undetected,
even by sophisticated security systems, for months or years. As
a result, the minority approach is essentially precatory in
practice because complete compliance is not feasible.
The majority approach also presents compliance challenges
because it is often unclear whether acquisition of personal
information has occurred. Most data breach statutes do not
define the terms “acquisition” or “acquired.”23 Vermont’s data
breach statute, one of the few exceptions, provides factors for
determining whether personally identifiable information has
been acquired, including: “(i) indications that the information is
in the physical possession and control of a person without valid
authorization, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device
containing brokered personal information; (ii) indications that
the brokered personal information has been downloaded or
copied; (iii) indications that the brokered personal information
was used by an unauthorized person, such as fraudulent
accounts opened or instances of identity theft reported; or (iv)
that the brokered personal information has been made public.”24
With this guidance in mind, consider the following common
cybersecurity event. A threat actor gains access to a system,
running a PowerShell script across the network and touching
files containing personal information, but there is no evidence
either confirming or refuting that the information was
22. THOMAS, supra note 20, § 2:25; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-161
(West 2021) (‘“Breach of security’ means unauthorized access to electronic
files, media or data containing personal information that compromises the
security, confidentiality or integrity of personal information . . . .”); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2021) (‘“[B]reach of security’ means unauthorized
access to or unauthorized acquisition of electronic files, media, databases or
computerized data, containing personal information . . . .” (emphasis added)).
23. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-551 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01 (2021).
24. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430 (2022).
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transferred by the threat actor. Under Vermont’s statute, does
the absence of evidence of downloading or copying mean no
information was acquired? Reasonable minds can differ when
answering this question, which makes compliance with this
statute difficult and uniform application unlikely. This problem
is compounded by statutes that offer no guidance on the
meaning of “acquired” and demonstrates why data breach
statutes are ripe for revision.
III. EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING QUANTUM
COMPUTING, REQUIRES CHANGES TO THE CURRENT STATE DATA
BREACH NOTIFICATION REGIME
The evolution of encryption and, specifically, quantum
decryption technology, also exposes the need to transform data
breach notification laws to fit a modern era. In his Note, Data
Breach Notification Laws and the Quantum Decryption
Problem, Phillip Harmon argues that “the impending
realization of quantum decryption threatens to radically disrupt
efficacy of the current state-level data breach notification
patchwork.”25
Large-scale quantum computers threaten to turn the safety
of encrypting messages on its head.26 Indeed, the risk is so grave
that beginning in 2016, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) “initiated a process to solicit, evaluate, and
standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key
cryptographic algorithms.”27 The race is on, essentially, with
“the goal of post-quantum cryptography (also called
quantum-resistant
cryptography)
[being]
to
develop
cryptographic systems that are secure against both quantum
and classical computers, and can interoperate with existing
communications protocols and networks.”28

25. See Harmon, supra note 1, at 513.
26. See Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST (Jan. 3, 2017),
https://perma.cc/44RC-SYE4 (last updated Dec. 2, 2021) (“If large-scale
quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break many of the
public-key cryptosystems currently in use. This would seriously compromise
the confidentiality and integrity of digital communications on the Internet and
elsewhere.”).
27. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Many state data breach notification statutes were designed
with a safe harbor for encryption of data. For example, Virginia’s
data breach notification statute provides that “breach of the
security of the system” is defined as
the unauthorized access and acquisition of unencrypted and
unredacted computerized data that compromises the
security or confidentiality of personal information
maintained by an individual or entity as part of a database
of personal information regarding multiple individuals and
that causes, or the individual or entity reasonably believes
has caused, or will cause, identity theft or other fraud to any
resident of the Commonwealth.29

The Commonwealth defines “encrypted” as the
“transformation of data through the use of an algorithmic
process into a form in which there is a low probability of
assigning meaning without the use of a confidential process or
key, or the securing of the information by another method that
renders the data elements unreadable or unusable.”30
As Harmon points out in his Note, in the age of quantum
computing, with quantum decryption looming, how does one
consider a statute like Virginia’s that speaks to the “low
probability of assigning meaning without the use of”31 a
decryption key?
Harmon addresses a number of issues related to quantum
decryption technologies in his Note. Harmon concludes that “to
soften the impact of this development, data breach notification
laws should separate any reference of encryption from the
definition of a breach to require alerts corresponding to past
breaches made presently harmful by shifts in relative
encryption security.”32 Similarly, he argues that “statutes
should require that data holders keep accurate records of data
that they have held so that they can issue comprehensive
notifications regarding past breaches.”33

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Harmon, supra note 1, at 513.
Id. at 514.
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Though changes to data breach notification laws were
proposed in 2021, those proposed changes are modest.34 The
National Conference of State Legislatures notes that in 2021 the
trends included legislation that would “[e]stablish or shorten the
time frame within which an entity must report a breach”;
“[r]equire state or local government entities to report data
breaches”; “provide an affirmative defense for entities that had
reasonable security practices in place at the time of a breach”;
“[e]xpand definitions of ‘personal information’ (e.g., to include
biometric information, health information, etc.)”; and “require
private sector entities to report breaches to the state attorney
general or other state entity.”35
What are absent from these 2021 legislative changes are
amendments to capture an evolving threat landscape coupled
with evolving technologies. These state data breach notification
laws effectively create a patchwork quilt of requirements that
national businesses and organizations must navigate, law by
law, in the midst of a large-scale consumer data breach. The
result can be that the same incident may give rise to notification
requirements under one state law but not the other, with
similarly situated consumers in different states facing wildly
different outcomes.
IV. THE PUSH FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO UNIFY A NOTICE
STANDARD AND ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS
The best path forward to address these concerns may be the
implementation of a federal data breach notification standard.
Sectorial federal notification requirements are in place,
depending on the industry, with the granddaddy of such
legislation being the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).36 Harmon concludes that
“[t]he federal government is best situated to implement these
34. 2021 Security Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/V79D-FR8H (describing common trends in
state data breach notification legislation).
35. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); see 45 C.F.R. pt. 164
(2022). Even with HIPAA, challenges remain with regard to the definition of
access in light of new technologies. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2022) (defining
breach as the “acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health
information”).
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changes by issuing its own data breach notification law, both
because of its broad jurisdiction and because of its better access
to relevant information on the state of technological
advancements.”37
While data breach notification bills continue to be proposed
at the federal level, none have advanced far in Congress, and
they primarily address unifying requirements and notification
timelines rather than access and evolving technologies.38 For
example, Senators Warner, Rubio, and Collins proposed the
“Cyber Incident Notification Act of 2021”39 which required
certain covered entities to report cyber intrusions or potential
cyber intrusions, within twenty-four hours. However, notably
missing was a definition of cyber intrusion, which the Bill left
up to rulemaking authorities.
Federal legislation aimed at addressing these concerns
would be welcome but should equally be built with the flexibility
to withstand emerging cyber incidents and technology.

37. Harmon, supra note 1, at 514.
38. See Maria Korolov, Pressure Grows for Federal Data Breach
Legislation, DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (June 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/YDU4WBES.
39. S. 2407, 117th Cong. (2021), https://perma.cc/LD39-PUX6 (PDF).

